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The Cover: A diptych by Kubo Shunman dated c. 1800. Confucius and Lao-tze are depicted playing go while the Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara, in the guise of a courtesan, watches. To the right and left are a tortoise and a crane, signifying auspicious old age. The print thus pays tribute to the extreme antiquity and universality of the game.

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Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

Go World News

by John Power

International

Samsung final: Cho Sonjin vs. Lee

Cho Sonjin has shown that his victory over Cho Chikun in the Honinbo title was no fluke by reaching the final of the 4th Samsung Cup World Open Baduk Championship. However, he is faced with a formidable opponent in the best-of-five final: Lee Chang-ho of Korea, who will be shooting for his third Samsung Cup in a row.

In this year's tournament, Japanese representatives posted their best results for some time in international go, with three Nihon Ki-in players (Cho Sonjin, of course, is a Korean national) reaching the quarter-finals, then the same three reaching the semifinals.

The three players who did well are Hikosaka Naoto, Yamada Kimio, and Cho Sonjin. The more 'senior' Japanese representatives fell by the wayside in earlier rounds. Yoda Norimoto, who has been Japan's most successful player in international tournaments in the 90s, lost to an up-and-coming Korean player, Ahn Cho-young. Cho Chikun, who doesn't thrive on the short time allowances of international titles, was eliminated in the first round by Liu Xiaoguang of China. O Rissei, who does nearly as well as Yoda in international go, had the bad luck to run into Lee Chang-ho in the second round.

The excellent performance by Cho Sonjin is noteworthy. Despite his win over Cho Chikun, he is still a bit of an unknown quantity in Japan. Fans don't yet know how strong he really is, especially because he is not in contention in any other titles. Did he beat Cho Chikun just because the latter let his guard down against an unheralded challenger? Well, the top-notch performance he has turned in in reaching the Samsung final suggests otherwise. Perhaps the Honinbo win has given his self-confidence the boost it needed for him to become a star. The title match against Lee should be an interesting one.

Selected results from the opening rounds and the semifinal results are given below.

Incidentally, the Samsung Cup has followed the lead of the LG Cup in increasing the komi to 6½ points, which seems to have become the standard komi in Korea.

1st round (7 September 1999). Ahn Cho-young (Korea) beat Yoda (Japan), Cho Sonjin (Japan) b. Cao Dayuan (China), Wang Lei (China) b. Jiang Zhujiu ('Jujo') (Korea), O Rissei (Japan) b. Lee Sung-jae (Korea), Liu Xiaoguang (China) b. Cho Chikun (Japan).

2nd round (9 September). Hikosaka (Japan) b. Ahn (Korea), Kang Gi-song (a 17-year old Korean player) b. Yamashiro (Japan), Lee Chang-ho (Korea) b. O Rissei (Japan), Chang Hao (China) b. Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea), Yamada (Japan) b. Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea).

Quarterfinals (26 October). Hikosaka (Japan) b. Kang (Korea), Cho Sonjin (Japan) b. Wang (China), Lee (Korea) b. Chang Hao (China), Yamada (Japan) b. Kim (Korea).

Semifinals (28 October). Lee Chang-ho (B) beat Yamada by resignation; Cho Sonjin (B) beat Hikosaka by resignation.

Late news. The first game of the best-of-five final was played on 23 November in Kwangju (Cho's birthplace) in Korea and won by Lee (White) by resignation. The second game is scheduled for 6 December.

LG Cup World Championship Quarterfinals: Korea triumphs again

Korea has scored yet another triumph in the quarterfinals of the Korean-sponsored LG Cup World Championship, which were held at the Edmont Hotel in Tokyo on 15 November, with three Korean players gaining semifinal places.

Japan had done badly earlier in the tournament and had only one representative in the quarterfinals, so perhaps the results were a bigger shock for China, which saw three of its four players eliminated, including its top two, Chang Hao and Ma. Once again the Koreans have shown that in international go they rule the roost.

Here are some of the results from the first two rounds, held in Seoul in June, and the full quarterfinal results.

Round 1. Baek 4-dan (Korea) beat Michael Redmond (USA), Mok Jin-seuk (Korea) b. Hans Pietsch (Europe), Hikosaka (Japan) b. Choi Kyu-byung 9-dan (Korea), Kato Masao (Japan) b. Ahn Cho-young 5-dan (Korea), Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea) b. Cao Dayuan (China).

Round 2 (17 June). O Rissei (Japan) b. Mok (Korea), Ma (China) b. Hikosaka (Japan), Lee Chang-ho (Korea) b. Kato (Japan), Chang Hao (China) b. Cho Chikun (Japan), Wang Lei (China) b. Yoda (Japan), Cho (Korea) b. Shao Weigang 9-dan (China)

Quarterfinals (15 November). Yu Bin 9-dan (China) (W) beat O Rissei (Japan) by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points; Lee (Korea) (W) beat Ma (China) by $\frac{1}{2}$ point; Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan (Korea) (W) beat Chang Hao (China) by resignation; Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea) (B) beat Wang Lei (China) by resignation.

The semifinal pairings are Yu vs. Cho and Lee vs. Yoo. The games will be played in Seoul on February 10 next year.

News from Japan

Cho defends Meijin title, sets new record

Cho Chikun has convincingly rebuffed the challenge of Yoda Norimoto 9-dan for the 24th Meijin, winning the title match 4-1. Cho not only showed that he was suffering no after-effects from his unexpected defeat in the Honinbo title match, but also demonstrated once again his mastery of the go board. Most of the games were close contests, but Cho prevailed because of his ability to keep up the pressure from the beginning to the end of a game.

The third game, the only game that Yoda won, started in an unusual way: Yoda (Black) played his first move in Cho's bottom right corner, which is a breach of go etiquette. Fellow professionals interpreted this charitably as an expression of Yoda's strong fighting spirit while advising amateurs not to follow suit. Cho didn't seem to mind, judging by his comments after the game,

and, perhaps encouraged by his success in this game, Yoda did the same in the fifth game. The second time it didn't work.



Yet another big title and another record for Cho

Cho prevailed because of his complete mastery of two-day go — has someone said that before? In particular, the final game showed his versatility. Yoda took all four corners and so took the lead in territory, which is not usually the kind of game Cho likes, but he made a successful invasion of a large potential territory and gradually whittled down his opponent's lead.

Cho thus won the Meijin title for the fourth year in a row and the ninth time overall, topping Kobayashi Koichi's tally of eight, though not his record of seven in a row.

For Yoda, this defeat must have been quite discouraging. With the success of his junior disciple Cho Sonjin (their sensei is Ando Takeo 6-dan), he must have liked his chances of finally getting his hands on a big title. However, he was once again unable to find a chink in Cho's armour (he lost the 1998 Kisei title match to him 2-4). His continued failure to win a big-three title is a little ironic, considering his success on the

international stage.

The results:

Game 1 (1, 2 Sept.). Cho (W) by 1½.
 Game 2 (15, 16 Sept.). Cho (B) by 3½.
 Game 3 (29, 30 Sept.). Yoda (B) by resig.
 Game 4 (13, 14 Oct.). Cho (B) by resig.
 Game 5 (20, 21 Oct.). Cho (W) by 1½ points.

Most titles won

Cho is fast overhauling Sakata Eio's record for most titles won and at his present rate should pass him in two or three years. Kobayashi Koichi is in third place, quite a bit behind Cho, but, if he maintains his current form, he also has a chance of passing Sakata. The top ten (as of 30 November 1999) are:

1. Sakata Eio: 64
2. Cho Chikun: 59
3. Kobayashi Koichi: 51
4. Otake Hideo: 47
5. Kato Masao: 44
6. Rin Kaiho: 35
7. Fujisawa Shuko,
Ishida Yoshio: 23
9. Yoda Norimoto: 22
10. Takemiya Masaki: 20

The most remarkable thing about Cho's record is that 29 of his titles are big-three titles. A long way back in second place is Kobayashi with 16 (followed by Rin with 13, Takagawa with 10, Sakata 9, Fujisawa Shuko 8, and Takemiya 7). Cho is truly the monarch of two-day go.

Kobayashi Koichi wins 5th current title

This year the Acom Cup has undergone a change of sponsors, re-emerging as the Agon Kiriya Cup. The new sponsor is a little unusual for a go sponsor, being a Buddhist sect. The numbering sequence has been retained, so the 'new' title starts off as the 6th Agon Kiriya Cup.

The final of the 6th Cup was held on 10 October at the sect's headquarters in Kyoto, the Mt. Shaka Great Bodai Temple, and Kobayashi Koichi defeated Takao Shinji 6-dan by 3½ points for his first victory in this title.

Kobayashi has been having a good year and this is his fifth concurrent title. He had already won the Tengen (in December 1998), Judan and Gosei titles and the NEC Cup.

The Agon sect is sponsoring a title with the same name in China, and at the beginning of next year a best-of-three playoff between the two champions will be held in Beijing.

Osawa wins Women's Kakusei

Osawa Narumi, a 23-year-old 1-dan, has won her first title after just one and a half years as a professional (she turned pro after winning the Women's Amateur Championship in 1997). In the final of the 21st Women's Kakusei tournament, held on 20 August, she defeated Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan by 4½ points, playing white.

Yamada wins Ryusei title

The final of the 8th Ryusei tournament was held in Tokyo on 4 September. Yamada Kimio 7-dan, former Oza, was matched against Morita Michihiro 9-dan, winner of the 4th Ryusei.

The game was closely fought, but a ko fight started by Morita (Black) turned out badly and he had to resign after 204 moves. Yamada thus won his first Ryusei title and fifth title overall.

Yamashita wins King of the New Stars

Yamashita Keigo 6-dan scored successive wins in the 24th King of the New Stars title match to win this title for the second year in a row (the games were played on 20 September and 4 October). His opponent was Hane Naoki 7-dan.

Kudo makes unsuccessful challenge for Tengen title

Kudo Norio 9-dan (born on 2 August 1940) surprised the go world when he won the Tengen title in 1997 with a 3-1 win over Ryu Shikun. This was only the second title of a professional career that began in 1955. When Kobayashi Koichi challenged him last year, he was easily the favourite, but Kudo put up unexpectedly tough resistance and the match went the full distance before Kudo succumbed.



Kobayashi Koichi reviews the first game with Kudo Norio. If Kobayashi looks a bit different, it is because he has swapped his glasses for contact lenses.

At the age of 59, Kudo is not yet ready to just fade away. In the playoff to decide the challenger for the 25th Tengen title, held at the Nihon Ki-in on 30 September, he defeated Yamashita Keigo, who is some 38 years his junior and considered one of the most promising players of the younger generation.

When the title match started, however, it was a different story from last year. Kobayashi was more wary of his opponent this time; he played all-out in each game and made sure that he kept up the pressure on Kudo throughout. In the end, Kobayashi had just too much fire power and Kudo was unable to win a game.

Lamented Kudo: 'Either my opponent was too strong or I was too weak. I'll challenge again in ten years' time.'

The results:

Game 1 (Nov. 4). Kobayashi (B) by resig.
Game 2 (Nov. 11). Kobayashi (W) by 5½.
Game 3 (Nov. 18). Kobayashi (B) by resig.

Kobayashi is on a roll: he has now won six titles in the last 12 months.

1999 promotions: European pros advance

The two European professionals at the Nihon Ki-in — Catalin Taranu (Romania) in Nagoya and Hans Pietsch (Germany) in Tokyo — are steadily advancing up the dan ladder. Details of their promotions are given below, along with some other notable promotions this year.

To 9-dan: Kori Toshio (Kori is the 52nd active 9-dan at the Nihon Ki-in; there are 32 at the Kansai Ki-in. Just for the record, there are 19 in China, 20 in Korea, and 1 in Taiwan, making a total of 124 worldwide.)

To 8-dan: Fujisawa Kazunari (son of Shuko)

To 4-dan: Catalin Taranu (24 September)

To 3-dan: Hans Pietsch (1 September)

To 2-dan: Takemiya Yoko (the son of Takemiya Masaki)

Chinen defends Women's Honinbo title

The 18th Women's Honinbo title match was a triumph for the defending champion, Chinen Kaori. This was a little surprising, as she faced a tough challenger, Kobayashi Izumi, daughter of Kobayashi Koichi and

the late Kobayashi (formerly Kitani) Reiko. Kobayashi has been enjoying great form this year; recently she defeated Rin Kaiho in a preliminary round of the Meijin tournament and fell just two wins short of getting into the league, a feat that no woman player has ever achieved.

When the title match started, however, Chinen showed that she was more than a match for the challenger. She cleverly parried Kobayashi's attacks and kept the initiative throughout the series. Her only loss came when Kobayashi, in a losing position late in the second game, found a brilliant tesuji that even some top players following the game missed (see page 8).

This was Chinen's third Women's Honinbo title in a row. Incidentally, this year was the first time she played the title match *not* in an advanced stage of pregnancy (her husband is Yo Kagen 8-dan).

The results:

Game 1 (6 Oct.). Chinen (W) by resig.

Game 2 (14 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) by 9½.

Game 3 (27 Oct.). Chinen (W) by 10½.

Game 4 (17 Nov.). Chinen (B) by resig.

55th Honinbo league gets under way

All of the games in the first two rounds of the new Honinbo league have been played. The most notable development so far is the poor start of O Rissei, though it's too early to write him off. Cho Chikun started off ominously with two successive wins — he is probably just as determined to wrest the

Honinbo title back from Cho Sonjin as he was to recover his Kisei title from Kobayashi Satoru when the latter took it — but he stumbled in the third round against former Honinbo Rin Kaiho. Fans of Rin and the other great veteran player in the league, Otake Hideo, will be glad to see them making their presence felt in the league.

O Rissei to make first Kisei challenge

O Rissei has beaten Hikosaka Naoto 2–0 in the playoff to decide the challenger to Cho Chikun for the 24th Kisei title. The games were played on 14 and 21 October and O won each by resignation. This will be O's first Kisei challenge.

In 1998 O made unsuccessful challenges to Cho for the Honinbo and Meijin titles, losing both by 2–4 margins (there were actually seven games played in the Meijin title match, as one ended in a 'no result' because of a triple ko). He now makes a challenge for the third of the 'big three' titles and, having recently turned 40, he must feel that his time has come. The year 2000 will be his 30th year in Japan; taking the Kisei title would be a good way to celebrate, but convincing Cho will be the problem. The first game will be played in Nago City, Okinawa, on January 12 and 13, 2000.

Once again Hikosaka (aged 37) misses out on challenging for a big title. Even so, he has shown in the last couple of years that he is one of the top players on the Japanese go scene and is certainly the top Nagoya player. One day his luck will change.

55th Honinbo League (1999–2000) (Title-holder: Cho Sonjin)

Rank		CC	HN	OR	YK	RK	OH	OM	RS	Won	Lost
1	Cho Chikun				1	0		1		2	1
2	Hikosaka Naoto			1			0			1	1
3	O Rissei		0						0		2
4	Yamada Kimio	0				1				1	1
5	Rin Kaiho	1			0			0		1	2
5	Otake Hideo		1						0	1	1
5	O Meien	0				1				1	1
5	Ryu Shikun			1			1			2	



Cho plays the first move in the Oza title match. Cho started growing his moustache towards the end of his losing Honinbo title match.

Cho and O tied in Oza title match

Cho Chikun and O Rissei are fighting a preliminary skirmish in the 47th Oza title match. Cho made a good start by winning the first game after a furious large-scale centre struggle.

However, O, the title-holder, bounced back in the second game, which was played in the capital of his native Taiwan, Taipei, on November 18. Playing white, the challenger, Cho Chikun, started out by taking all four corners at the cost of creating a weak group in the centre. Cho thus staked the game on being able to save this group when the inevitable attack came, but for once his legendary *shinogi* ability let him down. After a massive fight that lasted for 120 moves, O captured the group and forced Cho to resign after Black 161. The defending champion thus leveled the score at 1-1.

This was a very important win for O: getting wiped out in the Oza would not be a good prelude to his Kisei challenge. Moreover, it put an end to a bit of a slump during which he had made a bad start in the Honinbo league and been eliminated from the LG Cup. He should now face the third game, scheduled for December 2, with more confidence.

The results:

Game 1 (25 Oct.). Cho (B) by 4½.

Game 2 (18 Nov.). O (B) by resig.

Yamashita makes 38th Judan playoff

Yamashita Keigo 6-dan, a promising young player whose name has already appeared a couple of times in this news report, has won the winners' section of the 38th Judan tournament and now has to wait to see who his opponent will be in the playoff with the losers' section. In the final game in the winners' section, played on 28 October, he defeated Nakano Hironari 9-dan.

25th Meijin league

The following three players have won places in the new Meijin league:

Imamura Yoshiaki 8-dan (Nagoya), who is playing in his first league at the age of 31;

Hane Naoki 7-dan (Nagoya), who is also making his debut. He and Hane Yasumasa 9-dan are the first father and son to both win places in a league;

O Meien 9-dan, making a comeback after a three-year absence. O will be playing in his fourth league.

Continued on page 14

18th Women's Honinbo Title Match, Game Two

Here is the game with the tesuji by Kobayashi Izumi referred to on page 6.

White: Kobayashi Izumi 4-dan

Black: Chinen Kaori, Women's Honinbo

Played on 14 October 1999.

Komi: 5½; time: 4 hours each.




Figure 1 (1-100)

Figure 1 (1-100). *Black takes the lead.*

White 24 should be at 25.

Black takes the lead with her successful invasion on the left side from 29 to 79.




Figure 2 (101-150)

Figure 2 (101-150). *Black stays ahead.*

White 100 in Figure 1 and White 2 here show that White feels she is behind.

Black 33 is too aggressive: Black 36 is preferable.

White 42. Playing at 49 would not secure enough territory to win. White has to keep going all-out.





Figure 3 (151-200)

100: ko



Dia. 1

Figure 3 (151-200). *A first-line brilliancy*

The exchange to 69 is good for Black.

White 84 is the tesuji. If Black connects at 1 in Dia. 1, White makes a throw-in and captures some stones after 5. In the game, Black is forced to fight a ko after 86 to 96.

In retrospect, Black should have played 77 at 85 or 83 at 89, but even Awaji 9-dan and Yamashiro 9-dan, who were following this game, didn't see 84 coming.

Continued on page 52

The 1st Chunlan Cup

Lee Chang-ho vs. Cho Hoon-hyun

The Chunlan Cup, with a first prize of \$150,000, was inaugurated last year as China's contribution to the many world championships. By the semifinals three Korean players (Lee Chang-ho, Cho Hoon-hyun and Choi Myung-hoon) and Chang Hao from China were the only ones left. In the semifinals, Lee beat his compatriot Choi and Cho beat Chang, setting up an all-Korean final. Lee Chang-ho was the favorite, and had he succeeded, it would have been his fifth straight international title. But his teacher and now rival Cho Hoon-hyun is the one player who has the most experience playing Lee, and he probably knows his style, strength, and weaknesses better than anyone else. In the first game (given below) of this best-of-three final, Lee resigned after he lost a big group, but he came back to win the second game by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points. In the final game, Lee missed a chance to take the lead in the early middle game and Cho won by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points to put a stop to Lee's run of victories on the international go circuit.

Game One

White: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan
Black: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan
 Komi: $5\frac{1}{2}$ points; time: 3 hours each.
 Played in Beijing on June 25, 1999.





Figure 1 (1-32)


Figure 1 (1-32). Black presses his advantage.

After White approaches with 4, it is usual for Black to take the empty lower left corner with 5. But apparently Black wanted to press his advantage in the upper right, so he pincer at 5 and attached with 7.




Dia. 1

When White has a stone in the upper left corner, jumping to 1 and pressing with 3 in Dia. 1 is the standard way for White to play at the top. His aim is to build a wall, then to pincer the black stone there. However, Black will cut through with 4 and 6. Without a white stone at A, White would find himself at a disadvantage on the right side.



Dia. 2


After Black 13, the usual way is for White to play 1 in Dia. 2, but Black will turn at 2. White must fix up his shape with 3 and 5, so Black secures the right side with 4 and 6. White A next is the key point.



Dia. 3


After White 16, cutting with Black 1 in *Dia. 3* is unreasonable. After the sequence to White 8, Black wants to block at A, but White would then make a double atari at B.

After White hanes with 16, Black might attach with 1 in *Dia. 4*. However, in spite of the loss of his four marked stones, after the sequence to 14, White need not feel dissatisfied because his thickness above, together with the circled stone, has mapped out a modest moyo on the right.



Dia. 4

14: connects at 7




Dia. 5

White must not connect with 1 in *Dia. 5* in answer to the marked black stone (Black 17 in the figure). After the sequence to Black 8 White is in trouble.


The correct response to Black 17 is White 1 in *Dia. 6*. If Black connects with 2, White 3 isolates the two black stones below.

If Black draws back with 2 in *Dia. 7*, White can live in the corner with the sequence to 7. Black cuts off the two white stones with 8 and

captures them with 12, but White takes the initiative on the right side with 15.




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

After White attaches with 18, Black takes the vital point at 19. White 1 in *Dia. 8* seems to be the natural move, but Black will block with 2 and the sequence to 8 will follow. White's position collapses.




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

White descends to 22 and Black has to connect at 23. Black must not block the marked stone with 1 in *Dia. 9*. After the sequence to White 10, Black is in trouble.

Since White is threatening to kill the black stones by attaching at A, Black must capture with 1 in *Dia. 10*. However, White will switch to the left side by cutting with 2 and 4. His prospects at the top are now very good.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

After White 2 in *Dia. 9*, Black might hug the two white stones tightly with 3 in *Dia. 11*. White still hanes and connects with 4 and 6. Black cannot defend against both A and B.





Figure 2 (33-50)
46: at 37

Figure 2 (33-50). *Black invades.*


Black answers White 32 in *Figure 1* by invading at 33. This is a severe invasion and White must find a good answer to it. Attaching on top with 1 in *Dia. 12* is dubious because Black gets a secure position with the sequence to 6, while White's outward influence is neutralized by Black's strong position at the top.



Dia. 12

White can secure his stones in the lower right corner with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 13* and Black will jump to 4. White would now like to turn at 5, but Black 6 is a devastating tesuji. If White blocks at A, he will have a hard time finding a good answer to Black B. White's stones on the right side are in trouble.

After White 50 —



Dia. 13





Figure 3 (51-65)


Figure 3 (51-65). The threat of a ko.

Black must extend to 51. If he lives in the corner with 1 in *Dia. 14*, White will force with the sequence to 6. After Black 7, White's stones in the lower right seem to be in danger, but White can threaten the four black stones with A. If Black defends, White can link up to his stones above by playing at B.



Dia. 14


When White plays 52 and 54, his stones in the lower right are alive, but, because of 53, Black can still threaten a ko at A, so White must be careful.



Dia. 15

White could capture the black stones in the corner unconditionally with 1 in *Dia. 15*. After White 5 it is clear that White wins the capturing race. However, Black A is sente, threatening to kill the corner with B. Black can also attack at B and chase White out at A.

Black 63 was a good move which captured the two marked white stones. Black could have peeped with 1 in *Dia. 16* to build thickness. If Lee had played this way, Cho would have played 2 on the right side, then occupied the empty corner with 4 on the 5-3 point to counter Black's thickness. After 6, White is alive on the right side.



Dia. 16




Figure 4 (65-80)



Figure 4 (65-80). Black kills the white stones.

Black 65 was a strong move. Simply blocking with 1 in *Dia. 17* is not very interesting. Af-

ter forcing with 2, White easily lives with 4.

If White answers Black 65 with 1 in *Dia. 18*, Black 2 becomes a strong move. White must live with the sequence to 7, but Black has been able to play the vital point at 6 which seriously affects the life of the white stones below. If White runs into the center with A, Black can start a ko with B, but, if White captures the corner with B, Black plays A and gets a vast wall stretching across the whole board.

White poked his head out into the center with 66, and Black captured the white stones on the right side with the sequence to 73. In compensation, the marked black stones found themselves under siege when White played 80. This was to be the deciding factor.





91, 99, and 105: at the marked stone;
96, 102, 111: at 88

Figure 5 (81-126). The losing move

When White plays 86, Black has to do something with his stones in the bottom right. He chooses to start a ko with 87.


However, he could have escaped into the center with the sequence to Black 9 in *Dia. 19*. After White 8, the black stones on the right are isolated and don't have two eyes. Can Black play elsewhere?

After *Dia. 19*, White is threatening to turn at 1 in *Dia. 20*. Black blocks at 2 and a capturing race results. After Black 6, if White A, Black B; if White B, Black A. Black wins either race.




Black wins the ko when he connects at 88 with 111. However, White has been able to play two moves at the top with 110 and 112.

Even if he loses his stones in the top center, Black is still in the game because his territory on the right side is big. Therefore, he shifts to the upper left corner with 115.



Dia. 21

Black 125 was the losing move. Black should have drawn back with 1 in Dia. 21. After White 4, the points A and B are miai. That is, if White A, Black will extend to B and get the territory in the corner as well as establish a presence on the upper left side. If White B, Black ataris at A.



Dia. 22




Figure 6 (127-166)


Figure 6 (127-166). No escape

After Black extends to 31, White 32 is the key move. White must not atari with 1 in Dia. 22. The sequence to White 7 would follow. If White next captured two stones with A, Black would atari with B and capture five stones. If White captures two stones with B, Black A secures the upper left corner for Black.

Black must rescue his center stones if he is to remain in contention. However, after White 66, Black has no hope of making two eyes. If he captures the two marked stones with 1 in Dia. 23, Black has no way to make two eyes or to escape after White 6.

Black resigns after White 166.

(Adapted from a commentary in *Paduk*, August 1999.)



Dia. 23

Go World News: Continued from page 8

Iwamoto Kaoru 1902-99

It is our sad duty to inform our readers that Iwamoto Kaoru died of pneumonia on 29 November 1999. Iwamoto was the greatest benefactor Western go has known; after making numerous instruction tours of Western countries, he donated his private fortune to found go centres in Sao Paulo, Amstelveen, New York and Seattle.

Iwamoto Kaoru had a long and varied career, twice winning the Honinbo title and playing a major role in rebuilding the Nihon Ki-in after the war. However, he will be most remembered for his great achievements in making go an international game.

The 54th Honinbo Title Match



Cho Chikun passing on some wisdom to the new Honinbo, Cho Sonjin, during the post-game analysis of the fifth game.

This year's big upset was Cho Sonjin capturing the Honinbo title from Cho Chikun, who held it for ten years. Nobody expected a relatively unknown 9-dan, who had not distinguished himself by winning any major tournaments, to dethrone the reigning champion. Sonjin has won only three minor tournaments — the 1986 Ryuen Cup, the 1991 Shinjin-O, and the 1992 Shin-ei tournament — but these were limited to low-ranked players. The feeling was that the challenger would be lucky to win even one game in the match, but after splitting the first four games, he went on to win the next two and take the title.

Sonjin has now entered the big time. All eyes are on him to see if his winning the Honinbo was a fluke or if he has finally come into his own at the age of 29. At the least, it has probably raised his confidence for he did very well in the Samsung Cup this year: he made it to the final where he will face Lee Chang-ho.

Cho Chikun still has his Meijin and Kisei titles, but he has vowed to recapture the Honinbo title next year and to surpass his record of ten straight Honinbo titles.

Game One

White: Cho Sonjin 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun, Honinbo

Played on May 12 & 13, 1999.

Komi: 5 ½ points; time 8 hours each.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1–20). A dubious joseki variation

In the joseki in the top left, Black made a bold sacrifice by cutting at 17 to prevent White A, so that he could take sente at 19. Apparently Chikun thought that this dubious variation was playable despite White 18, because Black 19 devalued White 14. (Both players are named Cho, so we are using their given names.) I think White should have played 14 at 19, but that is just a personal opinion. The opening through Black 19 was even.




Figure 1 (1–20)






Figure 2 (21-41)

Figure 2 (21-41). An incredible sequence

Anyone who plays a seven-game match against Chikun can count on meeting the incredible at some point during the match. In this match that point came in the sequence from Black 27 to 31. Most pros would have played 27 at 1 in *Dia. 1*, tolerating the slight




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

forcing effect of the marked stone. The reason is that after Black 29, connecting at 1 in *Dia. 2* is worse than *Dia. 1*, and Black lacks the ammunition to cut at 'a' and fight the ko. Few would think of Black 31. Sonjin spent an hour and a half on his answer at White 32, matching the hour and a half Chikun had spent on Black 27. White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3* would be a bad trade

for Black 2 and 4, but the decision between White 32 and White 1 in *Dia. 4* is difficult.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Figure 3 (42-65)

Figure 3 (42-65). White goes wrong.

After White's marked move, the threat of Black A-White B-Black C still remained, so White played 42, but White A might have been better. Black 45 was a strong reply to White 44, inducing White 46 and Black 47, which eliminated the cutting point at 53 (White 53-Black D). If White had played 42 at A, he might have been able to cut with 46 at 53. In any case, White made a clever move at 54, avoiding the normal approach at E, which would invite Black F. Unfortunately, White spoiled his own cleverness by playing 58, giv-

ing Black a perfect reply at 59. White should have played 58 one line lower, as Sonjin himself said after the game.




Figure 4 (66-100)

Figure 4 (66-100). The final challenge

Having lived on the lower side, with moves like A and B waiting to be played later, Black was clearly ahead. Sonjin issued his final challenge with White 92 to 98 on the left side, but Chikun was ready. He cut at Black 97, instead of 98, and continued with an accurately planned sequence.





Figure 5 (101-153)

Figure 5 (101-153). Black clinches the game.

Black 9 was the move that Black had prepared when he played the marked stone. If he makes the hane at 1 in *Dia. 5*, he wins the cap-

turing race with 3 and 5, but White can play 6 to 10 in sente. Although Black lives with 11, White 12 takes enough central territory to make the game very close. The moves Black actually played also gave White a large center, but Black had a safe lead of over ten points, minus the komi.



Dia. 5

Figure 6 (154-239). A defeat not wasted

Sonjin was completely defeated in this game. After his mistake at White 58, he was never in contention. But he played with encouraging vigor, considering that this was his first trial in a big title match, and he gained valuable experience, so this loss was no cause for pessimism.

Black wins by 6 1/2 points.




Figure 6 (154-239)

94: connects at 91

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Cho Sonjin 9-dan

Played on May 24 & 25, 1999.

Commentary by Ryu Shikun 7-dan.





Figure 1 (1-30)

Figure 1 (1-30). *A well-prepared invasion*

Black 9 and 11 were an unusual idea. They made Black heavy in the top left, and White 16 prepared to invade. For Black 17, I would have chosen the more aggressive joseki in *Dia. 1*, which might have discouraged White 'a'. After further preparations at 26 and 28 and nearly an hour of thought, White invaded at 30. Black took over an hour to choose his reply.



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (31-70). *The wrong way to live*

Black 31 to 39 were generally criticized. Perhaps Black should have settled for *Dia. 2*, capturing two white stones with 1 to 9. White gets forcing moves, but Black is in no position

to be finicky. Sonjin ended the first day by pondering Black 43 for forty-nine minutes, trying to find a way out of the trouble he had gotten himself into.






Figure 2 (31-70)



Dia. 2


White played 46 as a forcing move before living at A. Black played 47 to avoid being forced, well aware that he was leaving White a cut at B after Black 53. White B leads to the ko exchange in *Dia. 3*.



Dia. 3

White had no reason to avoid this favorable exchange, but he played 54 instead, apparently attracted by the cut at 58. Black

promptly shut him in at 59. White 64–Black 65–White C–Black D, and Black wins the capturing race by one move. Forced to make two eyes, White played 60 to 66. After 70, White is alive as shown in *Dia. 4*, but Black 'a' is sente, forcing White 'b', which means that Black can also play 'c' or 'd' in sente, threatening to release the marked stone, and White cannot hope to cut at 'c'. White should have lived by playing 66 at E, leaving the cut at F as a valid threat. He lost nearly a whole move here.



Dia. 4





Figure 3 (69–109)


Figure 3 (69–109). Time runs out.

Chikun's winning pattern is to think long and hard just before he goes into overtime, read out all the variations, then play accurately after overtime begins. In this game, he spent most of his remaining time on White 72, but Black 73 created more problems than White could hope to handle at a minute a move. From this point on, the initiative passed to Black, and Sonjin began to show his stuff. I would have played White 72 at 1 in *Dia. 5*,

playing White 11 or White 'a' after the joseki from Black 2 to 10 to leave a more peaceful position. At the end of this figure, since White 100 and 102 had been captured, White faced the ko in *Dia. 6*.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6
7: at 3

Figure 4 (110–149). Black gains the lead.

Lacking time, White began to make inexplicable moves, such as White 12 (instead of 14). Another of Chikun's patterns is to become disgusted with his mistakes and choose a path that leads to his own downfall. That may have happened in this game.

Black 17 was brilliant, despite the bad shape, and Black 19 was also large, both in territory and for its implications on the left side, but White made gains too. White 18 and 20 rescued the marked stones, made White 30 and 34 sente, and nullified the ko in *Dia. 6*. Black's large group became eyeless and had to link to safety at 39. Nevertheless, by the end of this figure, Black had taken over the lead. If

White now secured the left side by playing above 19, Black would take a large territory by closing the lower right corner.




Figure 4 (110-149)

36: connects to the right of 18

Figure 5 (150-171). An ill-considered ko

In view of the state of the game, White 50 was natural, but Black was in the stronger ko-fighting position, so White 58 could only lose. With this move, White sealed his own fate. He should have played the standard defensive maneuvers in *Dia. 7*. To me, *Dia. 7* looks like an even fight.




Figure 5 (150-171)


60, 66: at 50; 63, 68: below 50;

Figure 6 (172-203). End of a winning streak

Black 83 declared victory, gaining over fifty points by turning white territory into

black. This stopped a string of 11 consecutive wins by Chikun when playing White in Honinbo title games.

White resigns after Black 203.



Dia. 7




Figure 6 (172-203)

Game Three

White: Cho Sonjin 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played on May 31 & June 1, 1999.

Figure 1 (1-78). A three-hour move

White 36 can be played at 39, followed by Black 38-White 63-Black A-White 36-Black 37-White 71, but that seemed to be what Black wanted, so White extended at 36. Chikun thought for over three hours, then sealed Black 37 to end the first day. On the second

day, Sonjin used White 62 as a sacrifice to capture Black 11 and 13. He decided not to follow up by cutting with White 78 at B, to avoid being squeezed by Black 11–White 13–Black C–White 11, but that variation was playable. After Black lives with D, White can expand at E.




Figure 1 (1–78)




Figure 2 (79–136)

90: takes ko at 86; 93: at 87; 96, 102, (at 86); 99, 107: (at 87); 109, 115 : right of 82; 112: at 82

Figure 2 (79–136). The aftermath of a ko

In the ko fight that followed White 86, White could have played 100 at 104 to make a clean sweep of the left side. After Black played 105, there was no way for White to mop up all of the black stones there with just one move. Black could probably have lived by playing

123 at 124. The moves he played instead looked nimble, but when White 136 closed off the left side, the lead became unclear.





Figure 3 (137–231)

109: connects at 76; 124: takes ko at 120;
125: connects to the right of 105;
130: at 121; 131: at 66

Figure 3 (137–231). Misplaced optimism

In the endgame, Sonjin did not realize how much territory Black could get in the center, and made the mistake of thinking that he was ahead. He should have played White 48 at 1 in *Dia. 1* to trim down the center and prepare for White 'a' or 'b'. Then the game would have been fairly close, certainly closer than the actual final score.

Black wins by 7 1/2 points.



Dia. 1

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Cho Sonjin 9-dan

Played on June 10 & 11, 1999.

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-59)

Figure 1 (1-59). A good opening for Black

White 16 built up strength, but White shouldn't play this way unless he can follow through by splitting Black at A. After 19, White needed to defend at 31. Instead, he played 20. Black made a good start through 27, and continued to hold the lead into the next figure.




Figure 2 (60-92)

Figure 2 (60-92). Fighting in the center

In the midst of a busy center fight, White took time out to play 60 on the right side. He was reaching for too much; this move let Black start a superb attack at 61. Black eased up by

playing 67 instead of 73, but White found a sharp counterattack at 76. After White 78, Black should have played 79 at A, leading to the lettered exchange from A to E.




Figure 3 (93-176)

Figure 3 (93-176). The fighting spreads.

Black chose the severe combination of 93 and 95, instead of the merely adequate move at 121, and the fight spread to the bottom right corner. White ended up by linking out at 140 and 142 while Black captured the white stones on the lower side, but, as Sonjin commented, Black would have been in trouble if White had played 114 at 122. As soon as the bottom right was settled, more fighting started at the top, where White should have played 156 at 165.




Figure 4 (177-284)

148: at 115; 180: at 169; 184: at 171

Figure 4 (177–284). *Calamity in the corner*

White's corner would have been safe if he had answered Black 79 at 83. As it was, the corner territory changed hands, and Black went on to win by half a point. He had fought well, while White had made a disturbing number of un-Honinbo-like mistakes.

Black wins by 1/2 point.

Game Five

White: Cho Sonjin 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played on June 22 & 23, 1999

Comments by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan and Kajiwaru Takeo 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1–52)

Figure 1 (1–52). *The choice of a joseki*

Instead of playing the more common three-space pincer or the diagonal move at 8, Black picked a fight with 7.

Takemiya: 'I couldn't play that way.'

Kajiwaru: 'An idiotic move, contrary to go theory.'

The joseki through Black 51 is regarded as unfavorable to Black and has not been seen much recently.

Takemiya: 'I don't like all those black stones on the first line.'

Figure 2 (53–75). *Overplays right and left*

Takemiya: 'White 54 was restrained, but it looks good, because pushing at Black 55 is not very big.'




Figure 2 (53–75)

Kajiwaru: 'White didn't need to play 54. His top right group was already alive. What was he doing? Black 55 was an ideal point.'

Black 61 was considered an overplay.

Takemiya: 'I would have played at A or B. White 64 has a good feel, leaving the next move up to Black.'

Black 67 was also considered an overplay.

Kajiwaru: 'Overplays are raining down on all sides.'




Figure 3 (76–126)

109: connects at 102

Figure 3 (76–126). *Black falters.*

Takemiya: 'Black 77 was a truly greedy move. I think Black could have done well enough by playing at 86, attacking White's top'

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Black: Cho Sonjin 9-dan

Played on July 5 & 6, 1999.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-46)

44: connects at 27

Figure 1 (1-46). Joseki variations

The joseki begun by White 12 was tested in a number of games seven or eight years ago. White 38, which cost Chikun an hour and 40 minutes of thought, is one of three possible variations at this point.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

In the first variation, White plays elsewhere, at A for example, and Black plays 1 in Dia. 1. That threatens forcing ataris at 'a' and 'b', so White defends with 2 or 'c'. In the second variation, White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 2, capturing four black stones. Black will now

play on the upper side (if he plays 'a', White 'b' captures everything). The third variation, which is the one White chose, also captured the four black stones, but it let Black give atari at 43 and 45. Many pros would have balked at giving Black those two ataris.





Figure 2 (47-70)

Figure 2 (47-70). Black takes gote.

Now Black had to decide between playing 47 and playing on the upper side. If he chose the latter course, White would pounce at 2 in Dia. 3. Answering at Black 4 is out of the question; Black will play 3, 5, and 7, taking the side and giving up the corner. That leaves the marked stone in a position to annoy White later, and Black also gets sente to play 9, but Sonjin apparently considered the loss of the bottom left corner too big to allow.



Dia. 3

After White 48, Black had to invade at 49, but he did not need to take gote at 65. He could have traded Black A for White B, then played Black 70 or Black C. If White attacks at 65, Black plays D and lives, with either Black E or Black F next.

Black 69 was a vague move. This may be Sonjin's style, but I would have played Black 70.




Figure 3 (71-101)


Figure 3 (71-101). Black takes gote again.

Of all the white moves in this game, 72 is the hardest to understand. The sequence through 75 left Black free of worries. I would have played White 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 4*, not the usual strategy in this position, but effective in this game. White will keep pestering Black's corner and wait for a chance to play around 'a'.


From 77 to 83, Black took gote again, building power and letting White decide what to do next. Given the difficulty of the position, this was a plucky maneuver, but Sonjin apparently wanted to play this way, and the game remained close. Black's calm approach was keeping White under pressure, inviting mistakes.

After White extended to 84, Black defended confidently at 85, White captured a black stone with equal confidence, and Black attached at 89. The purpose of this last move was to limit White's lower side and, if possible, expand the right side, where Black had the makings of a huge territory. A key consider-

ation at this point was the potential for mischief still remaining in the marked white stone, but if White were to play 1 in *Dia. 5* now, Black would reply at 2 and let him link up with 3. White ends in gote and Black can take a large center.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 4 (101-136). Black goes for broke.

White 2 reduced the right side while enlarging White's own framework at the top. White seemed to be saying that this would be enough to win the game, but Black challenged that assessment with 3 to 7, preparing to resist White A with B. This took courage, because Black was abandoning the option of pushing into White's territory with C. Black could have retained that option by playing 3 at 5.





Figure 4 (101-136)

Black 15 to 23 were questionable, letting White get an ideal point at 24. I think White was now slightly ahead. Black could have played 17 at 1 in *Dia. 6*, gaining two more points of territory, but then Black 5 would not work. White pushes past with 6 and 8 (Black cannot cut at 'a' because of White 'b'–Black 'c'–White 'd'). Black 5 in *Dia. 6* would have made sense after Black 15 and 17 in the game, however. Black could also have played 5 at 8 in *Dia. 6*, and instead of playing 23 in the game, he could have taken more profit with Black E–White F–Black G.



Dia. 6

Dia. 7

Sonjin must have sensed that he was slipping behind, because he went for broke at Black 35. White 36 threatened White A, and dictated Black's next move. If Black were to give way and defend at A, White would play H, while Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7* would let White break up the right side with 2 and 4.

Figure 5 (137–163). A dramatic finish

That left 37 as Black's only choice. This was the strongest and best move. In view of this, White should have played the marked stone at 42, followed by Black 43 and White 47. With normal endgame play, White would then still be slightly ahead. After Black 37, White 40 did not work and Black had the winning position, but the drama was just starting.

Black 45 was a mistake. Black should have played 1 in *Dia. 8*. After Black 7, White can create a capturing race, but he hasn't the remotest chance of winning it. The capturing race that arose from White's cut at 60 in the game was

another story. White would have had the advantage, if he had played A next. He didn't, however; he played 62 and immediately had to resign. Following Black 63, the continuation is White A–Black B–White connects–Black C, and White loses.





Figure 5 (137–163)



Dia. 8

Dia. 9

If White plays 62 at A, the result is a ko. *Dia. 9* shows the best variation for Black. Black cannot answer White 9 at 'a' (White connects beside 9), so he will make a ko threat, perhaps at D in the game figure. White has ko threats too, starting at E, and can probably win if he plays correctly, but White was in overtime, so there is no telling what actually would have happened.

White resigns after Black 163.

(Games one to three: *Kido*, July 1999. Games four to six: *Monthly Go World*, August & September, 1999. Translated by James Davies.)

The 24th Meijin Title Match

Cho Chikun vs. Yoda Norimoto



Cho Chikun: still the Meijin after beating Yoda Norimoto 4-1 in the title match.

When Cho Chikun lost the Honinbo title to the relatively unknown Cho Sonjin, there was a feeling that this heralded the end of Cho's supremacy in Japanese go. Now Yoda Norimoto, a player with solid successes in the go world, was challenging him for his Meijin title. Yoda has won a number of titles, including the Gosei which he held for three consecutive terms. He is the undisputed lightning-go champion of the world, having won the NHK Cup for two consecutive years and each time the Asia TV Cup as well, where he beat all the top Korean and Chinese players. He also won the first Samsung Cup. Moreover, he challenged Cho in last year's Kisei title, so he already had received his 'baptism of fire' in a best-of-seven match. If Cho Sonjin could beat Cho Chikun, surely Yoda could too.

However, Cho seems to be out to prove that he is not a washed-up over-the-hill player. He made short work of the challenger, dispatching him with a one-sided score of 4-1. Judging from this match, it will probably be some time before Cho is relegated to the ranks of the has-beens.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Time: 8 hours each; komi: 5 ½ points.

Played on September 1 & 2, 1999.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-100)

Figure 1 (1–100). *Mistakes in the top right*

White 8 has been turning up from time to time recently. Black 9 is a popular response, but Black can also play A. The result in the game was that Black took profit in sente, while White got power with which to back up his pincer at 14. Black countered with an attachment at 15 and a cut at 21, possibly gaining some advantage in the sequence through White 30.



Dia. 1

Cho regretted making the low approach at White 52 in the top right corner, saying he should have come in high instead. The low approach gave Black a perfect opportunity to demonstrate the attach-and-extend joseki with 53 and 55. Yoda made the next mistake, however, at Black 61. He should have extended at 1 in Dia. 1. White cannot do much more than connect at 2, and Black can fight on advantageous terms with 3 and 5.

In answer to White 68, Black played 69 and so on to protect the right side, but this was also questionable. White 84 split the center and brought two black groups under attack. Black had to defend at 91 to prevent White B, but White 94 was severe. Black would have been in dire straits if White had played 100 at C.

Figure 2 (101–160). *Black misses a chance.*

Since White played the marked stone, Black was able to exchange his central group for a piece of White's upper side, but this result was inadequate. White 14 took an unshakeable lead. Black might have been able to turn

the tables if he had played 9 at 10, followed by White 12–Black 9–White A–Black B–White 46–Black C, and dragged his central group out into the open. It might not have had an easy time living, but White had weaknesses too.




Figure 2 (101–160)

25, 31, 37: left of 22; 28, 34: at 22




Figure 3 (161–240)

106: at 75; 116: at 107; 120, 126, 132, 138: at 114; 123, 129, 135, 140: at 117; 128: at 121; 133: above and right of 134; 136: at 118; 137: at 124

Figure 3 (161–240). *Black comes up short.*

After capturing the center, Cho let Yoda catch up considerably, but White's lead was too big to overturn.

White wins by 1 1/2 points.

Game Two

White: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Meijin

Played on September 15 & 16, 1999

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan





Figure 1 (1-69)


Figure 1 (1-69). White picks a fight.

White 22 is a difficult move to answer. If Black does not play 23 and 25, he comes out on the bad end of a forcing exchange.

White 34 invited Black to start a fight. White may have been testing his opponent, or perhaps he hoped to make use of his power in the top left. I can empathize with his choosing the most severe move, but I would have played 34 at 50. Cho needed no second invitation to invade at 35.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

After 40 and 42, White wanted to cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1. If Black tries to capture the group in the lower right by playing 10 and 12, White wins the capturing race. However, this only means that Black will play 10 at 1 in Dia. 2. If White responds around 'a', Black continues as in Dia. 1 and wins the capturing race. White must therefore play 2, letting Black attack with 3, and now White's top right group is in for a hard time, regardless of whether he plays 'b', 'c', or 'd' next.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

The inside hane at 1 in Dia. 3 looks equally unpromising, so White chose the outer hane at 44 and Black gained a large profit by capturing six stones. I think this set White back considerably. Playing White 40 and 42 and then sacrificing them was inconsistent. White

could have played 50 at 7 in *Dia. 4*, leaving the linking sequence from White 'a' to 'g' on the right side, but that sequence puts White in a depressed position, and the marked stones still turn out to have been bad moves.





Figure 2 (70-122)

Figure 2 (70-122). A tesuji trap


After White 70, Black had to make a tough choice between 71 and A. Following White 82, Cho made a bold incursion at 83, but I think Black B would have been adequate. Perhaps Cho avoided B because he thought that the continuation from White 2 to 8 in *Dia. 5* would put the 1-2 exchange in a bad light.



Dia. 5


Yoda may have considered cutting off Black's incursion with White 2 and 4 in *Dia. 6*,

but after capturing White 2, Black can invade the corner at 15. Apparently Yoda felt uneasy about the result of this, because he played White 4 at 'a'. That was a good move, but then White threw the game away by falling into a tesuji trap (Black 91-99).



Dia. 6

Instead of playing 90, White had to cut at 2 in *Dia. 7*. After sente moves at 4 and 6, White invades at 8. It's hard to say what might happen next, but if the variation from Black 9 to White 12 is played, Black is not in a pleasant position.



Dia. 7

Figure 3 (123-255). A foregone conclusion

The game had already been decided, but Yoda punished himself by playing it out to the bitter end.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.




Figure 3 (123–255)
106: at 99, 145: at 127

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Played on September 29 & 30, 1999.

Commentary by Hane Yasumasa 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1–28). A change of scenery

Yoda played his first stone in the top left corner, which is sometimes considered impolite. Afterward, Cho said he had enjoyed the change of scenery. To make sure that the game did not revert to a conventional pattern, he played White 2 in the corner where Black normally places 1.




Figure 1 (1–28)

The sequence that appeared in the bottom right mirrored the opening of the first game of the Honinbo match, with Cho playing White instead of Black. Black could have avoided this by playing 21 at 25, followed by White A and Black B, but Yoda thought he would lose that way, because of White's power in the top left.






Figure 2 (29–53)
45: takes ko above 36

Figure 2 (29–53). White's three mistakes

Cho regretted not answering Black's cut at 29 by taking the ko, playing White 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1*. To make up for this, he took the ko when Black played 35, but that was another mistake. He should have connected at 1 in *Dia. 2* and captured with 3 and 5, tolerating Black's sente atari at 4.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White 44 was still another mistake. White should have played 1 in *Dia. 3*, trading two stones for the group on the right. By 53, Black already had the better game.



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (54–100). Black holds the lead.

White captured some stones and secured eyes for his central group in the sequence from 56 to 80, only to have Black make an ideal attachment at 81. Black 91 was typical of Black's careful, correct play in this game.




Figure 3 (54–100)

Yoda had been playing more slowly than Cho, which is unusual, but his lavish use of his time allowance had paid off, and he now had a commanding lead.




Figure 4 (101–195)

Figure 4 (101–195). A victory for Yoda

By 73, Black had solved all the remaining problems White had managed to set for him, and the game was essentially over. Cho ignored Black 93 and played White 94 to create a suitable place to resign.

White resigns after Black 195.



Yoda Norimoto trying to figure out what went wrong in the sixth game.

Game Four

White: Yoda Norimoto, 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun, Meijin

Played on October 13 & 14, 1999.

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-42)


Figure 1 (1-42). A slow start

This game set a new mark for slow play in Meijin title competition. Only nine moves were completed in the first morning, and the sealed move that ended the afternoon session was Black 23. The previous record was 27 moves on the first day, set by Cho and Otake in 1982. The pace picked up on the second morning, as the joseki in the top left corner was played out, but then slowed again, with White 42 the last move before lunch.



Dia. 1

White 42 was unexpected and profound. The expected move at this point was White 1 in *Dia. 1*, which I liked at the time, but the post-game analysis showed that Black 8, capturing two stones, was very big. White 42 left the sequence from White 1 to 7 in *Dia. 1* as an option for later and also left open the variation in *Dia. 2*.



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (43-102). Action at last

The 43-44 exchange was played with confidence on both sides. Black 45 to 51 eliminated the sequences shown in *Dias. 1* and 2. Black 53 created sudden tension in what had so far been a peaceful game. Next, Black jabbed with a pair of ataris at 55 and 57, while White struck across the knight's move at 62.

Cho spent over an hour deciding to play Black 63 instead of A.





Figure 2 (43-102)



Dia. 3

Yoda must have felt pleased about the result through White 74, judging from his conservative reply to Black 75. To exploit his power in the center, he needed to attack this stone with White 1 in Dia. 3, possibly continuing with Black 2 to White 11. Instead, he played White 76 to 82, then surrounded a comparatively modest center with 84 to 90.

With all but the last three minutes of his time allowance gone, Cho dropped a thunderbolt at Black 91. No one had foreseen this attachment. The sequence through White 102 forestalled White B and C in sente, and suddenly Black had the lead.





Figure 3 (103-145)

Figure 3 (103-145). *The endgame begins.*

Cho regretted Black 7, saying he should have played Black A-White B-Black 33. If

White then played 7, Black could keep the lead by playing 9. After Black 15, White could have caused trouble with 1 in Dia. 4. Following White 7 in that diagram, White 'a' threatens both 'b' and 'c'. A few moves later, White lost points by missing a similar opportunity when he played 22 instead of C.



Dia. 4




Figure 4 (146-195)

Figure 4 (146-195). *A maddening defeat*

After reaching a promising position in the middle game, White had managed to drift thirteen or fourteen points behind on the board. This was a maddening way to lose.

White resigns after Black 195.

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun Meijin

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Played on October 20 & 21, 1999.

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-13). *Another top-left start*

Yoda, who has a superstitious streak,

played Black 1 in the top left corner again, hoping to repeat his success in the third game. The rules let you play wherever you like, and there are plenty of professionals who don't mind having Black start in the top left, but it's against tradition, so one hesitates. Perhaps we live in an age in which manners do not matter so much, but if it's all the same, one wonders whether a player of Yoda's caliber really needed to choose this corner.




Figure 1 (1-13)

White played the knight's move at 8 to prepare for the combination of 10 and 12. Yoda must have thought about playing Black A-White B-Black C next, but he decided to try the diagonal move at 13 instead.





Figure 2 (14-30)

Figure 2 (14-30). The reason for pushing

The most popular joseki, in which White plays 20 at A to catch Black 17 in a ladder, is unappealing in this game. Eventually White will have to capture at B, and in the meantime, Black can cause trouble by approaching the bottom left corner around C.



Dia. 1

Black normally answers White 22 at 25, but he had a reason for pushing out at 23 first. Suppose White plays 30 at 1 in Dia. 1. Black pushes downward at 2, White plays 3, and now Black 4 is sente, threatening 'a-b-c'. White has to reply at 5 and accept quite a bad result on the right side. If the marked stones were not on the board, White could ignore Black 4.

Dia. 1 has many variations, such as Black 6 at 'd' (White 7-Black 8-White 'e') or White 7 at 'f' (Black 'g'-White 'h'), but they all give similar results, none good for White. White's upper side is not as big as it looks, because it's open at the edges. In the game, White played 30 and netted Black 17.

Figure 3 (31-48). The Meijin's bite

Black capped at 31 to induce White 32 and the jump to Black 33. The direct jumping sequence (Black 33-White 38-Black 43-White A) leaves a less settled position and is harder to play. White was forced into a series of low-brow moves from 36 to 40, because if he cuts at 1 in Dia. 2, which is better style, he has no reply to Black 2 and 4. Permitting the ladder at Black 8 is beneath consideration. Black got a fully satisfactory result through 43.






Figure 3 (31-48)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Black's next move at 45 was praised by some commentators and condemned by others. Whatever its merits, it elicited a very characteristic response at White 46 from Cho. The usual idea here would be White B or C, but those moves lack bite. If Black answers White 46 at 1 in *Dia. 3*, White 2 forces Black 3, so White gets to defend the corner at 4. Black had to choose between allowing that and approaching the corner immediately at 47.

Figure 4 (49-66). A forceful invasion

Black 49, the sealed move that ended the first day, was a forceful and probably a good invasion. Yoda said he played it because he

thought he was behind. White developed from the marked stone by making further strong contact moves at 52 and 58.





Figure 4 (49-66)

Black played 59 and 61 so that he could continue at 63. The books advise answering a move like White 1 in *Dia. 4* with the hane at 2, but White connects at 3 and Black extends to 4, so White gets the next turn. Black can't omit 4, because of White 'a'. Note that Black 4 threatens 'b', while in the game Black played 'c', threatening 'd'. White defended at 66 in the figure, making the territories easy to count. Everyone thought Black was ahead at this point. No voices were heard speaking up for White.



Dia. 4





Figure 5 (67-100)

Figure 5 (67-100). Black wins the middle game.

Black pursued risky profit with the diagonal move at 67. The risk was that White might switch to 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*. On the left side, after White 7, Black can play 8 to start a ko, but the timing is difficult. If Black doesn't start the ko and lets White play 9, he hasn't accomplished very much.




Dia. 5


Kato Masao 9-dan recommended White 1 in *Dia. 6*, so that White could use 'a-b' and 'c-d' as ko threats. After that, White 'e' takes a huge territory on the right side, and if White also plays 'f', Black has to seek life. In any case, I think White should have ignored Black 67, but when you're playing, you tend to be beset by worries.

Black 69 seriously worsened White's position, but White 70 defies explanation. Kato's theory was that White didn't care what happened next. Black played 73 in sente, then

seized two stones with Black 75 to 79. This big capture must have awakened White to the probability of defeat. Nevertheless, many professionals felt that Black should have played 75 at A or B to defend the lower side.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7

After invading at 80, White answered Black's pincer at 81 by jumping to 82, but Black came out very well by capturing another stone with 83 and 85. White should have connected at 1 in *Dia. 7*. If Black makes the obvious reply at 2, White has a tesuji at 3 and 5, leading to a capturing race that Black loses. If Black plays 2 in *Dia. 8*, White has profited from 1 and Black's position is still not safe.



Dia. 8

Black 89 was another good move. When he linked up at 93, Black had a won position, as Yoda commented himself. All that remained was the endgame.





Figure 6 (101-150)


Figure 6 (101-150). *Black refrains.*

Black now had countless ways to win. Jumping to Black 7 was not a bad move, but he could have peeped at 1 in *Dia. 9*, then cut with 3 and 5. If White gives atari at 6, Black extends at 7 and escapes at either 'a' or 'b'.

Needing to stay linked together and trying to do a little more, White played a series of non-obvious moves from 8 to 14. White 14 was particularly neat, but Black could now have played 1 to 5 in *Dia. 10*. Black 1 and 5 cannot be captured. Yoda should have been able to see this instantly. He had two chances to play this sequence, at Black 15 and at Black 21. Only Yoda himself knows why he refrained. Perhaps being short of time and wanting to win safely had something to do with it.




Dia. 9



Dia. 10

The move Yoda regretted making was Black 43. This move was small. Almost anything else would have been better: Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*, for example, or the wedge at Black 'a' on the lower side.



Dia. 11

White 48 and 50 padded out an unlooked-for parcel of white territory. 'How did White ever get ten points here?' Yoda groaned afterward. Even from the spectators' point of view, it seemed unbelievable.

Figure 7 (151-200). *Black finally loses.*

The game was heading for a half-point finish. I think Black lost by playing 83, missing a chance to probe at 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12*. If White replies at 4, Black plays 5 in sente, then wedges at 7, cutting off a white stone. White continues with 12 to 16, but Black wins, as readers with confidence in their counting can verify for themselves. If White plays 4 at 6, Black plays 4, gaining two points in sente. Black can then continue as in the actual game and win by half a point.





Figure 7 (151–200)



Dia. 12

Black's chance vanished when White played 88, taking a half-point lead. Black

made another mistake somewhere later and lost by a point and a half.




Figure 8 (201–242)

41: connects (left of 31);
42: connects (right of 38)

Figure 8 (201–242). *A frame of mind*

Yoda played this match just as well as the Meijin, but he may have succumbed to self-inflicted pressure, feeling that he had to win because of Cho Sonjin's Honinbo victory. Go requires a detached frame of mind, which Sonjin-san had and Yoda may have lacked. Still, with all the ability Yoda displayed, he will undoubtedly be back in contention in the near future.

White wins by 1½ points.

(Games 1 and 2 from *Monthly Go World*, November 1999. Games 3 and 4 from *Go Weekly*. Game 5 from *Monthly Go World*, December. Translated by James Davies.)

The Kiseido Internet Go Server

Kiseido is setting up a go server on the World Wide Web. It will be known as **Go World Net**. We expect to be online sometime just before the end of 1999. Go players are invited to sign up and enjoy playing games with others throughout the world. Not only can you play games, you can also receive instruction. Site will also have a beginners' room. Until April 2000, membership will be free. You can access this server from any of the following three Kiseido mirror sites:


<http://www.yk.rim.or.jp/~kiseido/index.html>

<http://www.kiseido.com>


<http://go-world.net>

Six Endgame Problems on 11x11 Boards


In the six positions below, Black may not be able to win, but you are still asked to find his best endgame sequence. Answers start on the next page.




Problem 1




Problem 4




Problem 2



Problem 5




Problem 3



Problem 6


Answers to 11x11 Board Endgame Problems

Problem 1



Dia. 1: Not the most profitable

Black 1 to 5 in *Dia. 1* are the first moves that would occur to many amateurs, but this is not the most profitable sequence.



Dia. 2: The tesuji

Starting with the hane of Black 1 in *Dia. 2* is correct, but Black must next cut at 3. This is the tesuji in this position. White must defend at 4. Next, Black can continue as before with 5 and 7, ending in sente.


What is the effect of Black 3? Eventually, playing at 'a' is Black's privilege, so White must connect at 'b', and White's territory is reduced by one point. Black 3 also prevents White 'a', which would force Black to connect at 'c'. This is worth another point for Black.

Can White answer Black 3 by connecting at 'b'? If he does, Black can attach at 8. White has no choice but to play 4, and Black can link up at 5. White's territory in the upper left would be devastated.

Where should Black play next?


Attaching with Black 1 in the upper left corner in *Dia. 3* is a big move. If White blocks

with 2, Black can get a seki with 3 and 5. White ends in sente, but his corner territory has been wiped out; he only gets one point there for the stone he has captured at 1. However, White has a better way.




Dia. 3: A seki

White will answer Black 1 with 2 in *Dia. 4* and live in sente. After Black connects with 3, White's five points of territory have been reduced to two (playing the point below 1 is Black's privilege). Now 'a' and 'b' are miai — worth six points each — that is, if White 'a', Black 'b'.




Dia. 4: Better for White



Dia. 5: The correct order of moves

After Black completes his maneuvers on the right side in *Dia. 2*, he should exchange 1 for White 2 in *Dia. 5*. Both of these moves are


worth six points. (Note that 'a' is White's privilege; this move will eventually require Black to defend against an atari at 'b'.) Now Black plays in the upper left corner with 3 and 5. These two moves are worth four points in gote for Black.



Dia. 6: White wins by five points.

Only two- and one-point endgame moves remain. White 1 in *Dia. 6* is worth two points in gote. Black 2 and 4 are each worth one point in sente. The game ends when White defends with 10. White wins by five points.

What would be the result if Black played ordinary endgame moves?




Dia. 7: Ordinary moves


In the sequence in *Dia. 7*, Black doesn't play any of the tesujis shown in the preceding diagrams. The result is that Black loses by nine points instead of five — a four-point difference!

Problem 2

Black 1 in *Dia. 1*, known as the 'monkey jump', is the biggest move. Attaching with White 2 is the usual way to limit Black's incursion. After Black 7, White ends in gote because he has to connect at 8.



Dia. 1: The monkey jump




Dia. 2: Omitting the connection

If White omits 8 in *Dia. 1*, Black will atari with 1 in *Dia. 2*. If White tries to escape by running away with 2, 4, and 6, his position collapses after Black 7.

Next, Black switches to the upper left corner.


Black plays 1 in *Dia. 3*. White must be careful. He might be tempted to cut off the black stone at 1 with 2, but, if he does, Black will start a ko with 3. This is a big ko; White has no viable ko threats, but Black has a big one at 'a'.




Dia. 3: A big ko

Against Black 1, White has no choice but to quell the black stone at the top with 2 in *Dia. 4*. This allows Black to connect with 3. This sequence is worth five points in gote for Black.

There are now three endgame points left: 'a', which is worth four points; 'b', worth three points; and 'c', worth two points.




Dia. 4: five points in gote




Dia. 5: three points in sente

The point 'b' in *Dia. 4* is the most difficult to calculate. If White answers Black 1 in *Dia. 5* with 2, Black gains one point on the right and White loses two at the top. Compare this situation when White plays 'a' before Black 1 and Black defends with 'b'. This is worth three points in sente for Black. However, it does not take into account the possibility that White might ignore Black 1.



Dia. 6: Three and a half points in gote


Since White 2 in *Dia. 5* ends in gote, White will ignore Black 1 in *Dia. 6* and play elsewhere. Black can next play 3 in sente. After Black 5 there is a ko at 'a', and this is worth half a point. Therefore, Black 1 is really worth three and a half points in gote.



Dia. 7: Black wins by 2 points


White 1 in *Dia. 7* is the biggest move. Black 2 is Black's privilege, since it forces White to capture with 3. The game ends with Black 8. Black wins by two points. Note that Black wins the ko in the upper right corner, since he has more ko threats.

Problem 3




Dia. 1: The first tesuji

White's position in the upper right in *Dia. 1* is thin, so Black can make a placement at 1 without any fear. White has no choice but to play the sequence to 6. If White 2 at 'a', Black will play 3, and White can't cut at 5 because his stones will be short of liberties.




Dia. 2

If Black plays the ordinary endgame move at 1 in *Dia. 2*, White will defend with 2. The sequence to White 6 will follow, and White is two points better than in *Dia. 1*.




Dia. 3: An ordinary endgame sequence

Switching to the lower left corner, Black 1 to White 6 in *Dia. 3* seems to be an effective endgame sequence. But Black can do better than this.




Dia. 4: The tesuji

Black 1 in *Dia. 4* is the tesuji. If White resists with 2, Black will cut at 3. If White captures with 'a', Black will extend to 'b'. If White 'b', Black captures at 'd', and White will suffer a big loss. If White connects at 'c', Black will draw back to 'a'.




Dia. 5

Against White 2 in *Dia. 5*, Black will atari with 3, then squeeze with 5 and 7. Again White has suffered a big loss.




Dia. 6

Against Black 1, White has no choice but to retreat to 2 in *Dia. 6*. Next, Black turns his attention to the upper left corner. He might want to block at 'a', forcing White to defend at 'b', but he has a more profitable move.



Dia. 7: Black loses by three points


The cut of Black 1 and the throw-in of 3 in *Dia. 7* are the tesuji combination. With the sequence to White 8, Black has gained at least one point, but, depending on the result of the half-point ko at 3, his gain could be as much as two points. The final result is that Black loses by three points.



Dia. 8: Black loses by eight points

Let's look at the result if Black plays the ordinary endgame moves in *Dia. 8*. In this case, Black loses by eight points. Black 1 loses two points, Black 7 to 11 loses two points, and Black 13 loses one point. Altogether, Black has earned five points less than in *Dia. 7*.


Problem 4



Dia. 1

If Black plays the sequence from 1 to 5, White must defend at 6, so Black ends in sente. If White answers Black 1 by playing at 'a', Black will jump to 3 and White will suffer a big loss.


Black next turns his attention to the top.



Dia. 2

Capturing with Black 1 is now the biggest move. It is worth seven points.

White 2 is worth a bit more than five points. That is, if Black captures the two white stones, he will get four points for that capture as well as the point at 'a'. On the other hand, after White defends at 2, he can play the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c', leaving a half-point ko to be decided later.




Dia. 3

Black captures a stone with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, then White defends one with 4. Black takes the last full point with 5 and 7, ending in gote. Now White sets up the half-point ko with 8 and 10. Even if Black captures the ko first with 11, White still wins it: White has two threats (White 'a'–Black 'b' and to the left of 3), while Black has none.

Still, the result is a four-point victory for Black.


Problem 5



Dia. 1

8: connects at 1


The difficult point of this problem is in the lower right corner. When Black hanes at 1, White must not block at 2 in *Dia. 1*. If he does, Black will play 3, 5 and 7. If White connects with 8, Black will play 9 and live in the corner.



Dia. 2


9: captures at 1

When Black ataris with 7 in *Dia. 2*, White might play 8 to stop Black from getting two eyes. But Black will start a ko by capturing with 9. White has ko threats around 'a', while Black has ko threats around 'b'. However, if you count these threats, you will find that Black has more, so he will win the ko fight.




Dia. 3

In answer to Black 1 in *Dia. 3*, White has no choice but to extend to 2. After Black connects with 5, White 6 is the normal sequence, but Black is threatening to hane at 'a'. Therefore




Dia. 4

White will not play 6 in *Dia. 3*. Instead, he will hane and connect with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*. Black must defend with 4, so White ends in sente. Now he can come back and connect at 5. This is the correct order of moves.




Dia. 5

Next, Black throws in a stone at 1 *Dia. 5*, forcing White to capture with 2. This is worth one point in sente. Black 3 and 5 are worth two points in gote.



*Dia. 6: The game ends in a draw.
6: at 1*

White sets up a half-point ko with 1 in *Dia. 6*, but he has no chance of winning it because Black has three ko threats around 'a'.




Dia. 7: Black wins by one point.

What is the result if White had played 6 in *Dia. 3*, that is, White 1 in *Dia. 7*?

Black would immediately hane and connect with 2 and 4. White would then connect at 5, and Black again would hane and connect with 6 and 8. Finally, White would get the last point with 9 and 11. Black would win by one point.


What about Black 1 in *Dia. 5*?

If Black omitted this move and played 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8*, White would connect at 4 and Black would take the last point with 5. However, White would now win by two points.




Dia. 8

Problem 6




Dia. 1: Seki in sente

Whatever happens in this corner, Black 1 in *Dia. 1* is the vital point. If White isn't careful, a ko will arise in the corner, but Black has more ko threats. Therefore, he must play for a seki with the sequence to 6; Black ends in sente. If Black makes a placement at 4, he ends in gote after the sequence White 1–Black 2–White 6–Black 5. Black 1 at 2 leads to the same result.



Dia. 2: A ten-thousand-year ko


If White answers Black 3 with 4 in *Dia. 2*, Black will play 5 and the corner becomes a ten-thousand-year ko. Since the loss would be too great, White cannot allow this ko. White defends the lower right with 6, but —



Dia. 3: White dies

White 10: takes the ko
Black 13: takes the ko at 7


Black starts the ko with 7 in *Dia. 3*. White plays 8 to erase a ko threat, but Black has more, so he turns the corner into a real ko by filling a liberty with 9. White captures with 10 and Black makes a ko threat with 11. Black again captures the ko with 13; White now has no more threats, so Black will capture all the white stones in the upper left corner.



*Dia. 4: Continuation
6: connects*

Continuing from *Dia. 1*, Black switches to the lower right corner and plays Black 1 in *Dia. 4*. This is the tesuji in this position. With the sequence to 7, Black ends in gote, but he has gained 16 points.


If White plays 4 at 5, Black will atari at 7, and it will be White who ends in gote.



Dia. 5: The attachment is wrong


Attaching with Black 1 in *Dia. 5* is a bad move. After Black 3, White will not capture a stone at 5; instead he will descend to 4. After Black 9, the fate of the corner will be decided by a ko. In this position, Black has more ko threats, so he might be able to play this way.

In any case, this position frequently arises in games, so it is important to be aware of this ko.




Dia. 6: Seven, five, and three points

White 1 in Dia. 6 is worth seven points, Black 2 five points, and White 3 three points. After this, only moves worth two points or less remain.



Dia. 7: Black wins by eight points.

Black 1 and White 2 in Dia. 7 are miai and are worth two points each. The game ends when White defends at 6. Black wins by eight points.




Dia. 8

To see why Black 1 in Dia. 7 is worth two points, suppose White captured a stone with 1 in Dia. 8. Black would capture two stones, and White would recapture. Both Black and White have now captured two stones. Compare this to Dia. 7 where Black captures a stone for a two-point gain.


An Introduction to Basic Josekis (6)

This series is aimed at players around 20-kyu. It is intended to give them an understanding of the most commonly played josekis and how they are applied in the fuseki. Each move in the joseki is analyzed and the reason it is played is explained. The one-space pincer josekis presented in issues 85 and 86, and concluded here are not only straightforward and have few variations, they are also among the most frequently played josekis in modern go. Kyu-players would be well served by mastering them.

In this installment, we will conclude our study of the one-space pincer joseki and look at the variations which arise after White attaches at 1 in Dia. 1. Black 2 is the normal response. White now has two choices: to draw back to 'a' or to extend to 'b'.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Joseki)


If White draws back to 1, Black will defend the right side with 2. White exchanges 3 for Black 4, then cuts with 5. The sequence to White 9 is a joseki. By sacrificing his marked stone, Black ends in sente, while White is happy to have settled his stones. This is an even result.

Dia. 3 (Omitting the slide)

If White omits 3 in Dia. 2 and cuts immediately with 1 in Dia. 3, Black will defend the corner with 6 after White 5. A white invasion into Black's corner is now more difficult, even if White defends at 'a'.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Variation)

When White slides with the marked stone, connecting at Black 1 is another way that Black might play. However, after White takes solid profit in the corner with 2, Black's stones on the right are insecure. This variation cannot be called a joseki, but there might be special positions which give Black a good result.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 5 (A comparison)


The classic joseki is shown in this diagram. The position on the right is the same as in Dia. 2, but White's stones in that diagram seem to have yielded to some pressure. However —

Dia. 6 (An analysis)


After the joseki in Dia. 5, none of the moves in the sequence to White 8 are bad (this is the position in Dia. 2), so White need not feel that he has been forced. Black has managed to get a position on the outside, but, in exchange, White has gotten a secure position at the top without any bad aji.

Dia. 7 (Professional game 1)

In this game, the joseki in Dia. 2 was played. Black's stones at 8 and 10 work well with his two in the upper left. White has gotten a secure position in exchange, so this can be considered an even result.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Dia. 8 (Professional game 2)

Black answers White's attachment at 1 with an extension to 2. This is an unorthodox move, and it is not really a joseki. With the sequence to 10, Black has established positions on both sides, but his shape on the left is defective because White can peep at 'a'.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 9 (A complicated joseki)


Extending to White 2 is another variation of this joseki, but, after White 4, it can become extremely complicated. Even professionals are prone to mistakes in this variation. Black can answer White 4 by playing at either 'a' or 'b'.

Dia. 10 (A basic joseki)


Black 1 aims to push through at 'a', so White defends by peeping at 2. The sequence to 8 is the basic joseki. White 8 aims to play on both the left and the right.

Dia. 11 (Defending the left)

Since the marked white stone threatens to cut, Black defends with 1. However, White can invade the corner with 2. Since Black doesn't have a stone at 'a', his stones on the right are ineffective. This result is not satisfactory for Black. Therefore —



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

Dia. 12 (Defending the corner)


Black defends the corner with 1 and White cuts with 2. With the sequence to 6, White gets a secure base at the top as well as sente. Black has been able to secure the corner territory and stabilize his stones on the left. You should note that Black cannot omit 7.

Dia. 13 (The knight's move)

Since the result in Dia. 12 is a bit unsatisfactory for Black, he might try defending the right with the knight's move of 1 instead of the jump in Dia. 10. At first glance this may seem like a slack move, but White will have a hard time finding a good way to defend against Black 'a'.



Dia. 13




Dia. 14

Dia. 14 (Black is satisfied)

White defends against the cut by forcing with 1 and 3. However, Black is now thick on the right side and White has no more play against these stones. Black is quite satisfied with this result.


The small knight's move of the marked stone is what makes Black's position thick. This move is often seen in professional games. Somehow, White would like to prevent Black from playing it. What follows is a counterstrategy against this move.



Dia. 15

Dia. 15 (An interesting move)


White 5 is an interesting move often used by professional when they give amateurs two- and three-stone handicaps. In the left corner a *takamoku* (5-4 point) joseki was played, which left Black with a thick position. In this kind of situation, the pincer of the marked stone is very severe.



Dia. 16

Dia. 16 (Making sabaki)


White 1 is a light move. White's intention is to reduce Black's influence by making sabaki in this area.



Dia. 17

Dia. 17 (The cut)


The cut of White 1 is the key move in White's strategy.



Dia. 18

Dia. 18 (The sacrifice)


After the cut of the marked stone, Black ataris with 1. White descends to 2, following the proverb 'Sacrifice two stones!' Next —



Dia. 19

Dia. 19 (Sacrifice three stones!)

After forcing with 1, White sacrifices a third stone by playing 3. This move is important because it lets White block with 5, enabling him to invade the corner. After Black 6 —



Dia. 20

Dia. 20 (A sabaki joseki)

White completes the squeeze with 1, then invades the corner with 3. Because of 5 in Dia. 19, the invading stone can link up with its allies on the left. White's stones may be a bit thin, but his shape is quite flexible.

18th Women's Honinbo Title, Game Two

Continued from page 8

Yamashiro: '[Izumi's] tenacity is astonishing.' Awaji: 'If I'd been playing, I might have suffered the same fate.'

Figure 4 (201–271). A costly oversight

The result after 16 was an upset. Although behind for most of the game, Izumi never stopped fighting. That's the spirit that leads to tesujis like 84 in Figure 3.

White wins by 9½ points.

(Go Weekly, 25 October 1999)





Figure 4 (201–271)

ko: 6, 9, 12


The Kobayashi Opening

In this issue, an opening related to the mini-Chinese opening analyzed by Michael Redmond in *GW86* is studied. In that opening, Black played the 3-4 point stone toward the right edge (the marked stone) in *Dia. 1*, then played 1 and 3 along the bottom. Instead of making an enclosure with A, Black drove White toward the bottom with 5, then vigorously attacked with 7.




Dia. 1

As an alternative, Black can play 3 in *Dia. 2*, then, instead of playing the Chinese opening with an extension to A or B, stake out a position along the bottom with 5 and 7. This is known as the Kobayashi opening because Kobayashi Koichi often plays it. Black now waits for White to approach around C.




Dia. 2

After Black plays the marked stones in *Dia. 3*, White is faced with the problem of how to approach the black stone on the 3-4 point. If he approaches at 1, the pincer at 2 is severe. Whatever response White chooses, Black will build secure territory along the bottom, so White can't expect to get a good result.




Dia. 3

What about the high approach of White 1 in *Dia. 4*. This move is lighter than the low approach of White 1 in *Dia. 3*. Again a pincer such as Black 2 is the severest way because of the black stone in the upper right. Black could build a moyo along the bottom by attaching at A, but White would then be able to secure a solid position on the right.




Dia. 4

If White responds by jumping to 3 in *Dia. 5*, Black will answer with 4. If White again jumps to 5, Black will peep with 6, then extend to 8. Black has now mapped out territory at the bottom and along the right side, while White's stones are heavy.




Dia. 5

If White plays the joseki from 1 to 11 in *Dia. 6*, Black ends with sente, so he can make an enclosure in the upper right corner with 12. Moreover, the marked stone is well placed, so White will have a hard time destroying Black's territory at the bottom.




Dia. 6

White 1 in *Dia. 7* seems to be a light move. In positions where your opponent is strong, such moves are often a good way to make sabaki. But there is the defect at A. Next —




Dia. 7

Black jumps in between the two white stones with 1 in *Dia. 8*. The sequence to 10 is inevitable. Black not only gets huge territory in the lower right corner but also ends in sente, which he uses to make an enclosure with 11 in the upper right corner.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Defending with Black 1 *Dia. 9* is amateurish. White can now easily make

sabaki with the sequence to 10. Black must finally play 11, so he ends in gote.


Against the high approach, Black 1 in *Dia. 10* is the severest pincer. The one-space jumps of 2 and 4 are White's only moves. Black will then peep with 5 and extend to 7. Just as in *Dia. 5*, White ends up with a heavy position while Black's territory at the bottom is strong; he has also staked out a position on the right.



Dia. 10


As the above diagrams show, White can't expect to get a good result by playing the ordinary approach moves shown in *Dias. 3* and *4*. White has to try a different strategy.

The large knight's approach of White 1 in *Dia. 11* is far enough away that Black will have a harder time provoking a fight and thereby securing territory at the bottom. Black 2 is a calm response. What about White 3 at A?




Dia. 11

If White plays 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black 2 is the vital point. White strengthens his position by jumping to 3, but Black maps out the territory along the bottom with 4. If White now makes an enclosure with A, Black will take up a position on the left side with B.



Dia. 12


If White ignores Black 1 and extends to 2 in *Dia. 13*, Black will invade at 3. After Black 7, White's position on the right has collapsed. If White defended at A, his position on the right would be secure. In that case, Black would not have invaded at 3.




Dia. 13

When White makes the two-space extension with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11*, the vital point is Black 1 in *Dia. 14*. If White approaches with 2, Black strikes at another vital point with 3. White defends the right side with 5, then establishes a presence on the left side with 7.


In response to the marked stone in *Dia. 15*, White might jump to 1. In this case, peeping at 2 is the vital point. If White plays 3 at A, Black can aim at B. After White 3, Black will extend to C.




Dia. 14



Dia. 17



Dia. 15




Dia. 16

After White plays the marked stone in *Dia. 16* (1 in *Dia. 12*), Black might immediately invade with 1. The sequence to White 10 would be the expected result, but Black would not be happy with it. White has made a thick position in the center, so Black can't expect to get much territory at the bottom. Moreover, if Black tries to expand his territory in the upper right by pushing out with A, White will invade the corner with B.


It is better for Black to invade on the fourth line with 1 in *Dia. 17*. White can link up his stones with the sequence to 6, but Black can play 7, forcing White to defend with 8. (If White 6 at A, Black will attach at B.) Black can

then build a powerful moyo at the bottom by jumping to 9. Still, White can aim to invade at C.




Dia. 18

What about the pincer of Black 1 in *Dia. 18*? The usual response is for White to attach at 2.




Dia. 19

If Black thoughtlessly follows the joseki by playing the sequence to 9 in *Dia. 19*, Black's territory at the bottom will be wiped out. White anchors his group there with 10.



Dia. 20

Black can salvage his territory at the bottom by answering the marked white stone with 1 in *Dia. 20*, then playing the sequence to 7. However, White will switch to the top with 8 and 10. Black builds up his moyo at the bottom and isolates the white stones in the lower right with 11 and 13, but White takes the initiative in the upper right with a second approach move at 14.



Dia. 21

There a simple way for Black to answer the attachment of the marked white stone: he can extend to 1 in *Dia. 21*. White must answer with 2 and the sequence continues to Black 5. (Most readers should recognize this as the result of an elementary joseki seen many times in our

articles on the opening.) With this simple sequence, Black gets an ideal result: he has built up his moyo at the bottom, confined the white stones to the corner, and has incurred no damage to his stone in the upper right.




Figure 1

Let's look at two examples from professional games. The game in *Figure 1* was played between Im Sun-kun 9-dan (black) and Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan. After exchanging 11 for White 12, Black mapped out his territory at the bottom with 13. White then switched to the top with 14. After Black 15, White invaded the corner and Black attempted to build a moyo with the sequence to 23. White fought back with the moves to 30 and a fierce fight erupted.






Figure 2

In *Figure 2*, Im Sun-kun (black) again plays this opening pattern, this time against Choi Myung-hoon 7-dan. With the exception of White 2, the game follows the sequence we presented in *Dia. 14*. After the skirmish to Black 33 in the upper left, White invades at 34; this is the invasion White usually aims for in this position.



Dia. 22


We will briefly look at the high two-space approach move of White 1 in *Dia. 22*. Black can answer it with A or a pincer at B.



Dia. 23

Black 1 in *Dia. 23* leads to a straightforward variation. After White stands at 4, Black pincers at 5. White next turns at 6 and Black answers conservatively with 7. Black 7 at A would leave Black's position at the bottom vulnerable to the invasion shown in *Dia. 24*.

With 9, Black has staked out the territory at the bottom. Since White must answer with 10, Black gets sente and makes an enclosure in the upper right with 11. Even though White still has some aji at A and B, this result is clearly favorable for Black.



Dia. 24

Finally, let's look at the pincer of Black B in *Dia. 22*. *Figure 3* is another game in which Im Sun-kun (black) played this pattern. His opponent was Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan. After Black jumped to 15, White 16 was a skillful move. Black answered White 20 with 21, but this was a mistake. He should have captured at A instead. White was therefore able to start a fight for the territory at the bottom by attaching at 30.

(From the supplement to *Monthly Magazine The Baduk Guide*, September, 1999)




Figure 3

The Korean Style (2)

Korean Joseki Innovations


Oya Koichi 8-dan

This instalment covers the best-known Korean innovation: the contact play of Black 2 in Dia. 3 below. In fact, this is perhaps the move that first alerted the international go world to the fact that a lot of fruitful experimentation was being carried out in Korea.


2. A new concept

Josekis have kept evolving ever since the invention of go. Sometimes there are improvements, sometimes a pattern is abandoned; quite often a completely new way of thinking leads to the creation of a new pattern. The innovation we are looking at this month is an example of a completely new concept.

Dia. 1. The moves from 1 to 5 make up an ordinary sequence. The term 'ordinary' is a convenient way to put it; certainly, neither White nor Black is dissatisfied.



Dia. 1: an ordinary sequence




Dia. 2: emphasizing the centre

Dia. 2. If Black wants to emphasize the centre rather than the corner, he will pincer with 2 and seal White in with 4 and 6. This is the conventional wisdom in Japan.

Dia. 3. Korean go players were not satisfied with the 'ordinary' sequence in *Dia. 1*. Black has two stones on the 4th line, White


one each on the 2nd and 3rd lines: there must be some way for Black to make a severe attack on White, they reasoned. The move they devised is the side contact play of Black 2. This is a sharp move that exploits the lowness of White's position.

There is just one thing Black has to watch out for in playing 2. It will come out in our discussion of White's answers.




Dia. 3: the innovation

Dia. 4. If White counters with 2, Black 3 is good style. No matter how you look at it, Black gets a good result with 5 and 7. White may have captured a stone, but he has been forced into a painfully low position.




Dia. 4: good for Black




Dia. 5: good for White

Dia. 5. White might switch to 1 and 3 here instead of 4 in *Dia. 4*. If Black plays 4 to avoid being caught in a ladder, White plays 5 and gets a good result. Isn't there something funny about this? Instead of 4 —

Dia. 6. Black will play 4 and 6 here, cutting off the marked white stone and letting White get a ladder. Actually this is also good for White. Let's reveal the reason.



Dia. 6: good for White




Dia. 7: tewari


Dia. 7. The sequence from 1 to 5 here is quite feasible. Next, White plays 'a' and Black cuts at 'b', after which White sets up the ladder to 'e'. This gives the same result as *Dia. 6*. White has definitely settled his group, so he is satisfied. Black would like to think that White has suffered a loss of one move and one point by playing 'a', but that's not the way it really is. If White invades with 'f', Black 'g', White 'h', the white stone at 'a' suddenly comes alive.

Things don't work out well for Black, so one might conclude that Black 2 in *Dia. 3* is not possible, but the secret lies in the ladder. Black can play this move only when the ladder in *Dia. 6* is bad for White or when Black can aim at playing a really effective ladder-block.

Dia. 8. If the ladder is favourable for Black, he is not afraid of White 4. After the moves to 9, White has a painfully low position, as in *Dia. 4*.



Dia. 8: good for Black




Dia. 9: White's choices

Dia. 9. If the ladder is good for Black, then White is more or less restricted to two answers. If White plays 2 at 'a', Black makes a hane at 'b' plus connection, and the marked black stone is right on the vital point. If instead of 2 White hastens to take


the 3-3 point with 'c', a hane at 'a' works perfectly for Black. White's shape would be pitiful. How about tenuki, I hear you ask. Well, that would be a novel approach . . . but I can guarantee that the result won't be good.

Dia. 10. Black 1 is the only move. Fore-stalling a cut with White 2 is natural. Black 3 stops White from securing a base. Perhaps the reader has noticed something. In *Dia. 1* the white group was more or less stabilized, but here White has no prospect of securing two eyes. This is what Black wants. He's going all out in the corner and at the bottom. This is a manifestation of the Korean rigorousness in going for victory that I referred to in the previous issue.



Dia. 10


what Black wants



Dia. 11

a White countermeasure


Dia. 11. Descending at 4 is an effective strategy. If Black 5, White pushes along with 6 and 8, then connects with 10. His plan is to store up strength and aim at attacking Black's four stones at the bottom. This sequence was immediately subjected to 'improvement'.




Dia. 12: Rin's improvement

Dia. 12. White peeps at 10 before connecting with 12. This move was devised by Rin Kaiho. Playing Black 11 at 'a' lets White play 'b' in sente, so White can switch to a large point elsewhere. Black has no choice but to connect at 11. White can aim at pulling out his stone later with 'a'; there's no doubt that this will be useful if a fight starts on the left side.

Dia. 13. If White peeps at 1 later, Black will counter with 2 and 4. There's no reason for him to play at 'a'. That's why the timing of 10 in *Dia. 12* is important.




Dia. 13: wrong timing



Dia. 14: a necessary move

Dia. 14. White is unable to extend along the bottom as in *Dia. 1*, so seeking a base in the corner with 1 is also conceivable. Black cuts at 2 and extends to 4, sealing White into the corner. White then has to hasten to slide to 5, which is painful. Of course, if there are no other large points on the board, sliding to 5 makes a fine position.




Dia. 15: no need to slide

Dia. 15. I seem to recall a joseki that goes like this. If White next slides to 'a', the result is the same as in the previous diagram. However, White 'a' in this diagram is a purely territorial move.


Why then is White 5 in *Dia. 14* necessary?

Dia. 16. If Black 1, White 2 is forced. However, suffering another forcing move at 3 is painful. If White yields to the temptation to tenuki, he will be jolted by Black 5. If 6, Black makes a placement at 7; if 8, he ataries

at 9. What to do? If White 'a', he dies after Black 'b'; if instead of 'a' White plays 'c', he can live, but Black captures two stones in sente with 'a' — death would be preferable. If White plays 6 at 8, a ko for the whole group follows after Black 9. White 'a', Black 7, White 'c', Black 6, White 'd'.




Dia. 16: can't tenuki
4: tenuki



Dia. 17: can tenuki
4: tenuki

Dia. 17. The difference from *Dia. 16* is the exchange of the marked stones. A small exchange like this makes a big difference to the life and death of the corner group. Now White shows a lordly disdain for Black 3: he has nothing to fear.


When you choose *Dia. 14*, you should consider the moves to 5 as a set sequence.



Dia. 18: an alternative for Black


Dia. 18. If Black has some reason to feel uneasy about his left-side position and wants to block at 4 in sente, he should have underneath at 2. Locally, Black 'a' will be sente, forcing White 'b', after which Black 'c'

will also be sente. These are both gains for Black.




Dia. 19: plenty of eye shape

Dia. 19. A combination often seen in actual play recently is White 3, pushing an extra move, and 5. The advantage for White is that he gets plenty of eye shape. If Black 6, White makes shape by wedging in at 7 and connecting. After 10, White ataries at 11 and makes nice shape. Using Black 8 to cut at 9 is unreasonable — you can research the variations yourself.



Dia. 20: one option for Black


Dia. 20. Instead of 6 in the previous diagram, Black 1 here seems superior. The 2–4 combination is still good style; White waits to see which way Black goes. If Black values the left side, he will play 5, but that lets White strengthen his eye shape with 6 and 8.



Dia. 21: correct style


Dia. 21. When Black wants to keep harassing White, denying him eye shape, he connects at 1. The original aim of attaching with the marked stone was to make life tough for White, so this diagram is a natural

continuation. For that reason, the connection of 1 is often seen in professional games.



Dia. 22: looking forward to the cut

Dia. 22. If Black wants to keep open the possibility of cutting at 'a', the hane at 1 is feasible. The question of whether/when to go through with the cut or whether to play so as to make White connect is difficult, but having this option is a plus for Black.




Dia. 23: thin

Dia. 23. Just for reference — the peep of 1 is a move invented by Cho Hoon-hyun of Korea. This is the kind of position in which White naturally wants to innovate, but 1 is really thin and doesn't enjoy a good reputation. Please remember it as a move for special circumstances.

My analysis has meandered here and there, but, in a word, my conclusion is that Black has nothing to worry about if the ladder favours him. Moreover, Black has various kinds of sente moves and points to aim at, so White will have to be on his toes. If Black makes the right strategic choice, an unfavourable result is inconceivable.


Ref. Dia. Let's look at an example from a professional game, from the 23rd Meijin league. I'm sure all my readers appreciate why White plays the peep of 1. It's a preliminary to attaching at 3. At this stage, Black has no choice but to answer at 2 or 'a'.

Black pushes up with 4 and 6, then attaches at 8. This is an important game, and you can see that Black is playing tightly.



Ref. Dia.

White: Kobayashi Koichi
Black: Yoda Norimoto
(February 5, 1998)



Dia. 1: wrong timing for the peep


Dia. 1. This diagram shows what happens when White fails to make the peep in advance. If he lets Black set up the ladder first with 10, Black won't connect in answer to 11. Naturally he presses at 12, a move possible only because White has messed up the timing. If White plays 1 at 11, then countering with Black 12 would be very bad: it would be like a dislocated jaw.

Instead of 9 in the Ref. Dia. —

Dia. 2. White 1, to forestall the wedge at 'a', is also feasible. The result to 6 is, of course, equal. Oh, that reminds me — our game example last issue was also from Yoda. The in-form players study more than

the rest of us.


(Kido, August 1998. Translated by John Power.)



Dia. 2: forestalling the wedge

Translator's note

Although the side-contact play in this issue is justly regarded as a Korean innovation, since it was seriously researched and developed there, its first recorded appearances were in professional games in Japan.



White: Magari Reiki 8-dan

Black: Matsumoto Tokuji 5-dan

9th Nihon Ki-in Ch'ship

(January 18, 1961)

The above game is given by one book as the first example of this move being played on its own as part of a fuseki strategy and not because of a special relationship with a different part of the board. This was followed by a game played in 1964. All in all, there are 17 examples from 1960 to 1995, but the move was not systematically studied and developed in Japan.

The above information comes from the

book *Igo Deta (= data) enjoy Magazin '96* (that's the Japanese title), a spin-off of a Nihon Ki-in project to record 34,000 professional games from 1960 to 1995 in a computer database. (A sizeable part of the collection was at one time commercially available on CD-ROM, but has since been withdrawn from the market, apparently because of copyright problems.)

However, the lineage of the move actually goes back a little further: Go Seigen played it in a game against Takagawa in 1959 (one year too early to make it into the database — thanks to Jim Davies for bringing the game to my attention). The opening is given below.





Figure 1 (1-24)
White: Go Seigen 9-dan
Black: Takagawa Shukaku 8-dan
Played on 12, 13 February 1959

This was the third game in the fifth best-of-three match held between Go Seigen and Takagawa Honinbo. The Mainichi organized these matches nearly every year after the Honinbo title was decided — in a sense it was a match between the official number one and the real number one, Go Seigen, who did not participate in the Honinbo tournament after the war. (For more details, see *The Go Player's Almanac*, page 66.)


When Black played 15, he expected White 20, letting him extend to 22. Go didn't like that prospect, so he countered with

White 16.

According to the commentary by Takagawa in Volume 8 of the *Gendai no Meikyoku* (Modern Masterpieces) series, Black 17 at 1 in *Dia. 1* would be bad, permitting White 2 to 6. Switching 3 to 3 in *Dia. 2* would be no better.



Dia. 1: bad



Dia. 2: bad

If White uses 20 to cut above 23, Black will be satisfied to take profit with 20.

Figure 2 shows how the game continued.




Figure 2 (25-50)
32: connects

The Nihon Ki-in's file of game records before 1960 is incomplete, so we can't be dogmatic, but it's probably safe to give Go Seigen the credit for this innovation. Since his games are also studied a lot in Korea, it's quite possible that a Korean player took a hint from the above game. It would be interesting to hear the Korean side of the story.

4th Samsung Cup Semifinal: Lee vs. Yamada

This game gives some insight into Lee Chang-ho's strength. He's well known for his territory-oriented style, but he also knows how to attack and plays a very solid end-game. That means that beating him is no easy task. Here Yamada has a crack.

White: Yamada Kimio 7-dan (Japan)

Black: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan (Korea)

Played on 28 October 1999.

Komi: 6½; time: 3 hours each.

Commentary by Oya Koichi 8-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *White gets a heavy group.*

The cap of 18 is a strategy frequently employed against the low Chinese style. White next seeks sabaki with 26, whereupon Black plays the surprising move of 27. Should one call this a flexible move? A strong move? The usual idea would be to answer White 26 with Black 30. White should then be able to settle himself with White 28, Black A, White B, Black 29, White C. Lee refuses to permit this.

White pokes his head out with 30, but preferable would be living in the corner with White 32, Black 30, White D.

White switches to an enclosure in the top left with 36, but he leaves behind a heavy, cumbersome group on the right side.

White 44. White should play something on the right, taking the pressure off the heavy group and settling in for a long fight.




Figure 2 (51-100)
80: ko

Figure 2 (51-100). *A severe attack*

Black launches a severe attack with 51. The game is now very tough for White.

Black 73. Black should first peep at 78. White would then have to writhe around at the top to get life and the issue would be decided. Complications ensue in the game, though Black has an unshakeable lead.




Figure 3 (101-143)

Figure 3 (101-143). *Lee wraps it up.*

White resigns after Black 143.

(Gekkan Go Warudo, December 1999)

宣統後編



鄭松雲

